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Education and the Philosophy of the Kyoto School 
PAUL STANDISH 
Institute of Education, University of London 
KITARO NISHIDA AND THE KYOTO SCHOOL 
Let me emphasise that my remarks here are those of an amateur, but I thought it 
would be a good idea to start with some kind of introduction to the Kyoto School and 
especially to its most important thinker, Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945).1 
What has come to be known as the Kyoto School developed in this university on 
the strength of Nishida's work and that of his most prominent followers, especially 
Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962) and Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990). It continues to be the 
most distinctively Japanese contribution to what we think of as philosophy. In a sense 
philosophy did not exist in Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration, following the 
prolonged period of Japan's closure to the outside world (1600-1868). With the 
Restoration came a commitment to discover developments in Western culture and a 
kind of renaissance in Japan in intellectual life and in the arts. Philosophy was part of 
that renaissance, and its newness at the time is indicated by the fact that a new word 
had to be created for it (tetsugaku). Of course, in a broader sense, there had been 
philosophical enquiry through the centuries in Japan but nothing like the systematic 
study that had developed in the West. Nishida's originality is commonly taken to lie 
in the way that he brought a distinctively Japanese element-deriving from Buddhism 
in certain respects, though certainly not in any straightforward way-to his 
scholarship and engagement in Western philosophy. 
For present purposes, and in the light of the interests of this colloquium (in 
philosophy and psychology), I propose to concentrate on Nishida's philosophy of 
mind. 
Mind, matter, and the methodology of doubt 
Nishida questions the familiar question of how thought relates to things in the world. 
Is the mind a blank slate (tabula rasa) upon which things make their impressions, as 
the (philosophical) empiricist says? Or do things exist as things only insofar as they 
are perceived: esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived), as the (philosophical) idealist 
says. Nishida's objection to both of these explanations is that they assume too much. 
He writes: 'To understand true reality and to know the true nature of the universe and 
human life, we must discard all artificial assumptions, doubt whatever can be doubted, 
and proceed on the basis of direct and indubitable knowledge' (Nishida, 1990, p. 38). 
This falls short of the critical thinking that is needed: 
Highly critical thinking, which discards all arbitrary assumptions and starts from 
the most certain, direct knowledge, and thinking that assumes a reality outside the 
facts of direct experience are in no way compatible. Even such great philosophers 
as Locke and Kant fail· to escape the contradiction between these two kinds of 
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thinking. I intend to abandon all hypothetical thought and to engage in what I call 
critical thought. When we survey the history of philosophy, we see that Berkeley 
and Fichte also take this approach (p. 42). 
We tend to believe, he argues, that there are two types of experiential facts-
phenomena of consciousness and phenomena of matter-but actually there is only 
one: phenomena of consciousness. This remark might make us think that he must be 
committed to a kind of idealism. But in fact his position is different, for the idealist 
tends to posit, without evidence, that there is a thinking being that has these thoughts, 
whereas in fact all we can be sure of is that there is experience. The idea of a thinking 
being is an assumption we make on the basis of this experience, but this assumption 
leads us astray. Hence, adopting a term previously used by the philosopher-
psychologists Wilhelm Wundt and William James, he claims that we need a 
philosophy based on 'pure experience': 'In pure experience, our thinking, feeling, and 
willing are still undivided; there is a single activity, with no opposition between 
subject and object' (p. 48). Contrary, then, to the view that subject and object are 
realities that can exist independently of each other and that phenomena of 
consciousness arise through their interaction, Nishida tries to show that there are not 
two realities, mind and matter, but only one. Subject and object must then be 
understood as abstractions from pure experience, and it is failure to realise this that 
leads to pervasive errors in our thinking: 'Taking the distinction between subject and 
object as fundamental, some think that objective elements are included only in 
knowledge and that idiosyncratic, subjective events constitute feeling and volition. 
This view is mistaken in its basic assumptions' (p. 50). Any belief that there must be a 
realm of hard empirical fact rests upon dichotomisations that are not inherent in the 
fact itself: 'As a concrete fact, a flower is not at all like the purely material flower of 
scientists; it is pleasing, with a beauty of color shape, and scent. Heine gazed at the 
stars in a quite night sky and called them golden tacks in the azure. Though 
astronomers would laugh at his words as the folly of a poet, the true nature of stars 
may well be expressed in his phrase' (p. 49). 
In the above quotation it was said that thinking, feeling, and willing are one. The 
reason for this is that experience is always in a state of activity, even in its apparently 
more passive forms. That is to say that it is always motivated by some interest in 
which the will is operative. Hence, there is always an activity of will through which 
both the subject of consciousness and its object come into being, and this will is not a 
purely personal thing. This tells us something about the self too. When I think of 
myself as something to question (Who am I? What kind of person am I?), the thing 
that we think of as the self is in fact false. The reflective self is not the true self 
because the reflective self does not act. By contrast the self that matters is what is 
realised in pure experience. The will is the activity that most clearly expresses the self, 
and it is in the action of the will that we are most clearly conscious of ourselves (p. 
91), but, if I have understood this right, this is not a self-consciousness in the familiar 
sense: it is more like an absorption in what we are doing. 
Philosophy as usual? 
It is important that this is understood not just in terms of epistemology (of how we 
come to know things) but as an account of reality itself, for this is Nishida's sustained 
purpose. But up to this point, I want to suggest, the argument has taken place at a 
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level that is more or less exclusively intellectual, in the familiar terms of Western 
(especially Anglophone) philosophy. This may constrain our sense of the scope of his 
project. Perhaps the reference to will and feeling above lead beyond these terms, to 
something different in the name of philosophy. To tum in this direction then is to try 
to see how the influence of Buddhism-which surely must be thought of not just as a 
set of ideas but as a practice, a way of life-leads beyond these intellectualist confines. 
I do not mean to exaggerate this intellectualism in the Western philosophical 
tradition, for plainly there are thinkers whose work escapes its bounds. Even in so 
austere a work as the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we find Wittgenstein saying 
that 'The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the happy man' 
(Wittgenstein, 1961, 6.43), a thought that closely matches Nishida's reminder to us 
that 'Buddhist thought holds that according to one's mood the world becomes either 
heaven or hell' (Nishida, 1990, p. 49). And there is a robust tradition that, since 
classical Greece at least, has understood philosophy as a way of life. But there is a 
narrowing, professionalization of philosophy in the modem period, supported by the 
growth of universities, that inhibits this broader development. (Perhaps this is 
particularly an English disease.) It may be significant in this respect that, in the years 
following the Meiji Restoration, interest in Japan moved away from English 
philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and towards their contemporaries in Germany. 
The influence on Nishida in this respect is more evident still where he speaks of 
nature's relation to spirit (seishin, Geist, spirit/mind/psyche). Nature cannot be 
objectively independent of spirit but must involve a union of our senses of sight, 
touch, and so forth. And-as if following Schopenhauer-nature cannot be 
understood independently of the will. The basis of the infinity activity that is spirit 
and nature is what Nishida calls 'God'. He has no time either for 'infantile' 
conceptions of a god who stands outside and somehow controls the world, nor for 
hard-headed materialists who take material force as the basis for the universe, but he 
identifies his thought rather with the negative theology of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-
1464). 
Bearing in mind the inseparability of religion and philosophy in Buddhism, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the religious continues to be prominent in the subsequent 
development of Nishida's thought. In Section 2, which will relate his work more 
directly to currents in 20th Century Western philosophy, I want to gesture towards the 
questions of transcendence, nothingness, silence, and place (in Nishida: basho, 
sometimes translated as 'locus') that run through his work, knowing that others here 
are better qualified than I am to discuss these matters directly. But before this, 
something should be said about his philosophy as a philosophy of nothingness. 
Whereas in the West being has been taken to be the ground of reality, the East, 
Nishida observes, seems to have taken nothingness as its ground. What can this 
mean? This, no doubt, is an elusive idea-yet it is as well to remember that the idea of 
being as ground is itself also one that is difficult to grasp. (It is arguable that a 
preoccupation with ontology is pervasive, but it is fore grounded only in a particular 
philosophical tradition.) Nishida begins, as we have seen, by seeking to overcome (to 
render as nothing) the self that imagines itself to be a subject perceiving the objects of 
the world. Later, however, he comes to think of this in more radical terms, as 
something that surpasses any thought of coming to be or ceasing, as an absolute that 
escapes any relativisation, any defining opposition. In my remarks about place below 
I shall try to make this more clear. It should be said, however, that Nishida's thinking 
here is not governed solely by ideas drawn from Zen Buddhism, although to the 
outsider the resonances here may seem powerful ones. 
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Let me tum to some connections with Western thought to try to say something 
more about these matters. 
NISHIDA AND THE WEST 
The sketch of Nishida's philosophy of mind in the previous section suggested some 
fairly obvious lines of influence that he drew from his scholarship in Western 
philosophy, as well as pointing to aspects of his departure from this and to his 
originality. The two Western philosophers I have been asked to expand on here 
particularly are Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, and I shall do this in relation 
to the themes mentioned above. Let me first say something briefly about the strong 
connections of Heidegger with Japan. 
Nishida read Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) soon after its publication in 1927, but 
evidently he was critical in various ways. At one level this seems surprising as both 
philosophers are centrally concerned with overcoming the subject-object 
dichotomisation that has characterised so much of Western thought, and in some 
respects Nishida's emphasis on pure experience seems to resonate with Heidegger's 
insistence that the unified structure of being-in-the-world is fundamental. But the 
main point of difference would presumably be over Heidegger's preoccupation with 
the question of being (that is, of Being rather than beings, of Sein rather than 
Seiendes). It is worth drawing attention, nevertheless, to the fact that Heidegger's 
book was generally received with understanding and enthusiasm in Japan. There were 
five translations into Japanese before the first translation into English, in 1962, and a 
steady stream of Japanese scholars visited Heidegger in the years that followed the 
book's publication. For his part, Heidegger greatly appreciated this reception, 
believing, it seems, that his work had found in Japan an audience capable of reading it 
well. Moreover, in his 'Dialogue with a Japanese', he eulogised the Japanese way of 
life and thought (and the Japanese language), seeing it as offering a real alternative to 
the degradation of the West (of the English-speaking world in particular), whose 
thought had been progressively colonised by technology. 
It is against this backdrop that I tum first to the consideration of questions of space 
and place. 
Nothingness and place 
It is not until Heidegger's later writings that his ideas in this respect are most fully 
developed. While Being and Time gives a strong sense of the contextual, holistic 
nature of being-in-the-world, it is with the later idea of the Fourfold (Vierung) that 
this is elaborated in a more striking way. Heidegger adopts the idea of the Fourfold 
partly in the move away from his earlier direct enquiry into the nature of Being. The 
Fourfold is to be understood in terms of four forces or influences that condition our 
experience, whose crossing might be thought of a characteristic of the places in which 
we find ourselves. Places, to be sure, are not geometrical spaces, to be identified by 
points on a grid, but constructed rather out of meaningful relations. The Fourfold 
comprises earth, sky, gods, and mortals. The earth is to be understood in terms of our 
need for sustenance: it is where we plant our feet and lay down to rest; it is the source 
of our daily food and shelter. The sky refers to the changeable circumstances of 
human lives, including the changing seasons and the way these affect us, but 
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extending also to our own vulnerability to moods. The gods represent not personified 
deities but rather those higher aspirations by which we are drawn, those things that 
lead us think beyond the satisfaction of our needs. That we are mortals perhaps speaks 
for itself, though it is important to situate this in relation to Heidegger's earlier 
writings about our being-towards-death as an existential structure of our lives. We 
live our lives (at some level and no doubt intermittently) in the knowledge that we 
shall die, in a way that animals do not: animals are not mortal; they merely expire. 
And this awareness of our own mortality casts its shadow back across our lives as a 
whole. Hence, in speaking of the crossing of this Fourfold, Heidegger is echoing the 
Christian idea that we live our lives under the sign of the cross, but he is turning this 
to non-Christian purposes. The Fourfold is not to be understood as referring to some 
special state that we occasionally reach but as applicable to each and every 
circumstance in which we find ourselves. Looking at your life and circumstances in 
this way helps, for example, to show the gods you are serving. This helps us to 
understand the places where we are. 
Insofar as the Fourfold is a means of thinking about place, I want to contrast it 
with Derrida's pondering of Plato's Timaeus in his text entitled Khora, a term that 
recurs in the Plato dialogue. The Greek word khora is difficult to translate: at one 
level it means 'place', but it also means womb, and so carries a suggestion of 
referring not just to this place as against that place but rather to the origin of place and 
space themselves. Plato's dialogue is in part a cosmology in which precisely such 
things as the origins of place and space and world are at issue. Derrida is interested by 
the possibility of thinking of something that must lie behind or condition space and 
place as these are understood, in our common lives and in our philosophy. 
While Heidegger's conception of the Fourfold might perhaps be taken to suggest 
an occupying of space and place without remainder, where all terms are positive, 
Derrida's account in Khora might conceivably convey something closer to the 
nothingness behind being that Nishida seeks to reveal. I offer this only as tentative 
remark, but let me support the view a little further by referring to one ofDerrida's last 
works, his Paper Machine (2005), published in French in 2002. In Paper Machine 
Derrida pays much attention to the significance of documents in identifying us, 
especially in the light of the situation of those who are 'without papers' (such as 
asylum-seekers). But he presses the ideas here to deeper questions about the nature of 
writing, in documents, books, electronic devices. What, he asks, is the support for 
writing, by which he means, what is it that writing is on-the paper, the stone, the 
screen? This attention to what supports writing parallels, I believe, his concerns with 
what it is that supports or lies behind space and place, a groundless ground, a support 
without foundations. 
If this thought seems a little strained, let us relate it to a contrast between Western 
and Japanese art. Whereas the Western painter tends to populate the canvass, covering 
it in every part, even decorating the frame, in Japanese art the image lies, as it were, 
floating against a paper background that has not been worked, that is nothing, but that 
is the support for the image. Does this begin to connect with the philosophy of place 
in Nishida? 
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Language, silence, and transcendence 
Let me digress here to say that, when I have been in Japan, I have often found myself 
defending a view to the effect that language conditions human being, in: a way that 
has been found too 'Western'. Given the ways in which Buddhism (and perhaps 
Eastern thought more generally) seeks to move beyond language, this reaction is 
understandable. But I have not wanted to be a defender of the talkativeness of the 
West! The point, as far as I am concerned, is a more logical ,one: it is the 
Wittgensteinian one to the effect that initiation into language goes hand-in-hand with 
initiation into a community, and without this a human life is not possible (except in a 
merely biological sense). This is not at all to advocate talkativeness, any more than it 
is to disparage silence. Heidegger helps here when he says that 'Hearing and keeping 
silent [Schweigen] are possibilities belonging to discursive speech' (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 161). This is so in the sense that animals cannot keep silent; they cannot refrain 
from speech. So my view is that practices of silence need to be understood are 
possible only for the being that has language. 
As will become apparent in Section 3 of this paper, a doubt that I sometimes felt 
in reading the papers presented at the INPE symposium was that the idea of pure 
experience, in Nishida's earlier work, was somehow being associated with a notion of 
transcendence, with connotations of purity of a rather different kind. If a purification 
of experience were Nishida's concern, this would surely be in tension with the more 
intellectually confined notion of pure experience, where this was deployed to resist 
the positions of the empiricist and the idealist, identified in Section 1 above. There is 
a slipperiness about this term, I think, especially given the further associations with 
Pure Land Buddhism (Jodo-Shu). Nishida moved away from the use of this term quite 
early on, but he develops his account of transcendence, and I think this is important 
for those who seek to interpret his thought for education. Transcendence is normally 
associated with a movement upward, toward what is higher, and this has been its 
dominant connotation, in religious domains of thought and in the Western philosophy. 
I am happy to find that Nishida sometimes speaks of a transcendence down, which for 
me echoes thoughts I have found in Henri David Thoreau and in Stanley Cavell's 
interpretations of his work. It seems, moreover, that this might usefully be related to 
deconstruction in Derrida's work,where the unravelling of things simultaneously 
produces something new, and this continually. I shall be pleased if this can be 
discussed more fully, in Professor Nihimura's response and Professor Maehira's 
comments and in the ensuing discussion. 
In the remainder of this paper, it is necessary for me to lay the way for the remarks 
Professor Nihimura has prepared, for these are a continuation of his comments to me 
towards the end of the symposium. Hence, I repeat her the salient points in the 
response I presented to the speakers on that occasion. 
POSSIBILITIES OF BECOMING: THE AESTHETIC AND THE 
POLITICAL 
In the papers presented in the INPE symposium it was clear that 'becoming' was to be 
preferred to 'being', and 'transformation' to 'education', and those preferences seem 
important in resisting notions of fixed stages of maturation and clear teleologies. The 
prominence that is given by Motomori Kimura (1885-1946), on Nishimura's account, 
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to the individual's loneliness and anxiety seem also a powerful antidote in this respect. 
Nishida identified his own conception of the human being's relation to the world in 
terms of poiesis. His logic of place (locus, basho) is especially rich in overcoming 
Western subject-object dichotomisations, coinciding in certain respects with insights 
from phenomenology, but also providing an account of the background of 
nothingness that is distinctly Japanese. This is something different from the more 
existential thematisation of nothingness in Heidegger, I believe, and perhaps closer to 
Jacques Derrida's explorations, in Khora, of aspects of Plato's Timaeus. 
But there are still, in the philosophy of education derived from the Kyoto School, 
certain assumptions of progression or development that are in tension with 
possibilities of transformation. Can a theory of becoming, especially under 
institutional pressure towards explicit formulation, avoid sliding into claims regarding 
stages of development? Can it avoid losing sight of the variety of human experience? 
The contract I have in mind can be illustrated by the difference between the Great 
Doubt, in Buddhism, which involves passing through a series of stages on the way to 
enlightenment, and scepticism as this is explored in the work of Stanley Cavell, which 
sees the human tendency continually to call the conditions of being into doubt as 
inherent to the human condition. So my question to the exponents of this philosophy 
of education has been whether they retain a quest for foundations. 
In relation to Nishida's 'active intuition' and the kind of pure experience found in 
intense concentration (e.g., in a piano recital), Shoko Suzuki makes the remark: 'It is 
as though one were making a decision with absolute confidence in the face of abiding 
ambiguity. In other words, it is as though the action of intuition arises by the diffusion 
of knowledge through the body.' This may connect in certain respects with the idea of 
'flow' or of being 'in the zone', as the basketball coach puts it. Nevertheless, the 
formulation here is a much richer evocation of the idea. 
Is such a state of being, however, something we should always aspire to? My 
concern is with what such moments may block? Is there not an 'impurity' of 
experience that is inherent in the human condition, lived as it is with others with 
diverse purposes, and vulnerable as it is to our own irritability? Should we really 
transcend the messiness of human life? Do Nishida's remarks about a transcendence 
that goes downwards offer something closer to the kind of return to the ordinary I am 
suggesting here? 
NOTE 
For comparison: William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970). 
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